



ODAP
Dünyayı Okumak İçin...

ODAP CENTER GLOBAL

BULLETIN -

6



Fidan's Visit to Egypt



Putin's Retaliation Warning to Europe: Russia Opens a New Front in Maritime Trade



From the Mecca Agreement to the Israel Axis: India's Geopolitical Transformation and the Boycott Against Türkiye



Fidan's Libya Talks: Is Türkiye Moving from Tripoli to a Broader Libya Policy?



Ukraine's Visit to Belgrade: A New Test for Vučić's Balancing Act



The Global South Is No Longer Waiting for the West



The Han Kuang Exercises and Taiwan's Evolving Defense Strategy



U.S. Demands Compensation from Iran, Ignores Gaza: The Ultimate Double Standard in Human Rights



ODAP
Dünyayı Okumak İçin...



Fidan's Visit to Egypt

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's visit to Egypt on August 13-14, 2026, was not a single meeting. It was part of a multi-layered diplomatic effort that included contact with the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (GIS), Major General Hassan Rashad, a meeting with Foreign Minister Badr Abdelati in El Alamein, and a meeting with the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Nabil Fahmy. This intensity, when considered alongside the fact that the visit immediately followed the signing of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on August 7, 2026, reveals that the meetings were strategically timed. Fidan's meeting with the head of the GIS is particularly noteworthy. Contacts conducted through intelligence channels generally represent a preliminary stage where official political consensus has not yet matured, but strategic trust is being tested. In this context, the meeting with Rashad may serve to establish a basis for trust and information sharing before Egypt's possible participation in the Mecca Alliance. Indeed, Fidan did not leave this possibility implicit in his

joint press statement during the same visit, but directly mentioned it. He stated that Egypt's participation in the alliance was being evaluated and that he hoped Cairo would soon transform from a natural partner to an official partner. This statement confirms the expectation, already highlighted in previous regional analyses, that Egypt is considered a critical candidate for the Mecca Agreement. This assessment is driven by Cairo's ongoing defense cooperation with Jordan, concerns about the security of maritime trade along the Red Sea-Strait of Hormuz, and the normalization process with Ankara in recent years. Given the Mecca Agreement's collective deterrence clause, which considers an attack on one party as an attack on all three, Egypt's potential participation would represent not only a symbolic but also a functional expansion that would reshape the regional security architecture. Fidan's definition of the alliance in a defensive framework during his press conference, and his implicit comparison to the security partnership between Israel, the Greek Cypriot administration, and Greece, also serves to legitimize this expansion process. However, the delicate balances that Egypt maintains with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, as well as the presence of actors who are cautious about Türkiye's increasing military presence in the region, limit the assumption that the process will proceed linearly.. In conclusion, Fidan's visit to Egypt, and especially his meeting with the GIS President, shows that the possibility of the Mecca



Alliance expanding has moved from an implicit expectation to an explicit political goal. However, the speed at which this goal evolves into formal participation will continue to depend on regional balance calculations..



Putin's Retaliation Warning to Europe: Russia Opens a New Front in Maritime Trade

The tension stemming from the Ukraine war between Russia and the European Union is moving beyond land and airspace into the realm of maritime trade and the security of commercial vessels. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's statement—that in response to EU countries' inspections and sanction enforcement against Russian commercial vessels, ships operating in line with European interests could be targeted—has created a new security risk across European maritime trade routes, particularly in the Black Sea. With Lavrov stating that targets will be determined by Moscow, this declaration indicates that Russia has put direct retaliation options on the table against the EU's policies on the "shadow fleet."

At the core of Moscow's reaction lies the EU's intensified pressure on vessels dubbed the

"shadow fleet," which Russia uses to circumvent sanctions. Lavrov, arguing that Brussels is attempting to restrict Russia's capacity to generate revenue from global markets, evaluated the interception of Russia-linked vessels and the seizure of their cargo by EU countries as a violation of international law. For Russia, these policies represent a strategic pressure tool directly targeting the country's energy exports and war economy. Lavrov's phrase, "we will determine the targets ourselves," fundamentally alters the nature of the crisis. Moscow is broadening its retaliatory scope and increasing the likelihood of commercial vessels becoming direct targets of the war by signaling that maritime vessels acting in the economic or strategic interests of European countries—rather than just vessels directly belonging to EU states—could be targeted. This situation could extend Ukraine war-related security risks from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and Europe's broader maritime trade networks. The region has become increasingly fragile for commercial shipping since the outbreak of the war. Lavrov's statements signal that maritime trade may become further entangled in the security equation. Within this framework, Türkiye holds a unique position. Lavrov highlighted Ankara's stance in favor of Black Sea stability and its approach that commercial vessels should not be targeted. The Russian minister also claimed that Ukrainian UAVs had previously targeted Turkish cargo ships and the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.



ODAP
Dünyayı Okumak İçin...

These statements underline Türkiye's diplomatic mediation capacity and its strategic importance in maintaining maritime security in the Black Sea. For Ankara, the primary challenge is to prevent the expansion of conflict in the Black Sea while preserving a delicate balance in its relations with both Russia and Ukraine. While Türkiye's position under the Montreux Convention provides a control mechanism over the passage of warships, emerging risks to commercial shipping increase Ankara's diplomatic burden. Should these threats materialize, intense diplomatic and security traffic could unfold across the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.

Moscow's declarations also serve as an indirect message to Washington. Lavrov stated that they sent inquiries and are awaiting a response regarding allegations that the US provides intelligence support to Ukraine for attacks on civilian infrastructure. This reflects Moscow's intention to reflect the costs of Western military and intelligence support back onto the providing countries. On the other hand, targeting commercial vessels could drive up insurance and freight rates in international shipping, adversely affecting global supply chains and generating diplomatic costs for Russia as well.

Lavrov confirmed that short-term peace expectations remain low, stating that the war can only be halted when a long-term and sustainable solution is found. Consequently, the sanctions war between Russia and the EU is entering a new phase centered around maritime transport.

For Türkiye, the priority will remain preventing the Black Sea from devolving into a full-scale maritime security crisis.



From the Mecca Agreement to the Israel Axis: India's Geopolitical Transformation and the Boycott Against Türkiye

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan has stirred up geopolitical fault lines stretching from South Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean, triggering a serious diplomatic state of alert in New Delhi. Following the announcement of the alliance, calls in the Indian media for a rapidly escalating tourism and trade boycott against Türkiye may appear at first glance to be a momentary diplomatic reaction, but they reflect a much deeper strategic shift. Indeed, this wave of boycotts is a concrete reflection of India's shift away from its classic foreign policy rooted in anti-imperialism and the Non-Aligned Movement during the Jawaharlal Nehru era toward an ideological and military-technological axis with Israel under the Narendra Modi administration. Consequently, the development



in question should not be viewed merely as an isolated travel cancellation crisis but rather as a geopolitical reflex developed by the New Delhi-Tel Aviv axis in response to the Türkiye-Pakistan security partnership. Although the calls for a boycott featured in this news story initially came to the fore through media campaigns targeting Türkiye's tourism and service sectors - particularly the wedding planning and luxury travel segments- the true scale of the crisis can only be grasped in the context of New Delhi's deepening foreign policy shift. Deviating from India's pro-Palestinian, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist stance during the Jawaharlal Nehru era as part of the Non-Aligned Movement and particularly under Narendra Modi's leadership, the security, technology and "Hindutva" focused strategic partnership established with Israel is the main driver of this tension with Türkiye. New Delhi administration's characterization of Türkiye's military and diplomatic partnership with Pakistan -particularly regarding Kashmir and the Eastern Mediterranean- as a direct threat to its own national security reveals a structural security reflex developed by the Israel-India axis against the Türkiye-Pakistan axis, going beyond mere consumer boycotts. Ultimately, the current tension presents a global equation taking shape at the intersection of geopolitical lines stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to South Asia. This increasingly evident polarization between the India-Israel-UAE axis and Türkiye-Pakistan defense partnership is leading New Delhi to view

Türkiye not only as an actor that bolsters Pakistan's military power but also as one of the main pillars of the anti-Israel regional bloc This situation demonstrates that calls for civil boycotts have evolved into a covert diplomatic tool mobilized during times of crisis, rather than merely isolated social reactions. Consequently, this wave of boycotts triggered by the Mecca Agreement is a consequence of Türkiye's defensive moves in a multipolar world and the shifting balances in South Asia; the course of relations will depend on the balance New Delhi strikes between pragmatic commercial interests and its deepening Israel-centered security doctrine.



Fidan's Libya Talks: Is Türkiye Moving from Tripoli to a Broader Libya Policy?

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's meetings in Tripoli with Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh of the Libyan National Unity Government and other Libyan officials show that Türkiye is not only trying to maintain its existing relations with Libya, but also focusing on creating a wider diplomatic ground to reduce the country's political divisions.



Fidan's emphasis on a "constructive mediation" role suggests that Ankara does not see its role in Libya only through its political and security cooperation with the Tripoli government. In the coming period, one of Türkiye's main goals is likely to be keeping communication channels open with political actors in both eastern and western Libya and supporting a lasting political agreement. Türkiye's current position in Libya has mainly developed through the Security and Military Cooperation Agreement and the Maritime Jurisdiction Agreement, both signed in 2019. However, Türkiye's recent efforts to improve relations with countries such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which are also influential in Libya, have created a wider diplomatic space for Ankara. This may make it easier for Türkiye to establish direct or indirect contacts with actors in eastern Libya while maintaining its close relationship with the Tripoli government. Such an approach could help Ankara build a wider network of relations across Libya instead of depending on only one political center. One of the most important issues in the coming period will be the possible return of national elections to the political agenda. If the UN-led political process moves forward and the division between eastern and western Libya becomes less intense, Türkiye could play a more visible role in facilitating communication between the different sides.

However, this will depend on Ankara maintaining a balanced approach toward different Libyan actors and increasing cooperation rather than competition with other regional countries involved in Libya. The economic and energy dimensions will also remain important. Expanding Türkiye-Libya relations beyond security into energy, infrastructure, trade and reconstruction could strengthen the long-term relationship between the two countries. The framework created by the 2019 maritime agreement remains strategically important for Ankara, especially regarding maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. A more inclusive political structure in Libya could also help Türkiye protect these interests on a more stable diplomatic basis. In conclusion, Fidan's visit to Tripoli can be seen not as a completely new Libya policy, but as an effort to protect Türkiye's existing gains while expanding its diplomatic room for action. In the coming period, Ankara is likely to maintain its close relationship with Tripoli while increasing dialogue with actors in eastern Libya and improving coordination with regional countries such as Egypt. If this approach succeeds, Türkiye could become not only a party to the Libyan conflict, but also an important diplomatic actor capable of bringing different sides closer to the same table.



ODAP
Dünyayı Okumak İçin...




Ukraine's Visit to Belgrade: A New Test for Vučić's Balancing Act

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's official visit Aleksandar Vucic in Belgrade took place on August 8 and they held a joint press conference. During the meeting, Serbia's role in reconstruction of Ukraine's infrastructure through joint projects and a free trade agreement between Ukraine and Serbia, which has been under discussion for more than 2 decades, were discussed. It is reported that both sides are willing to cooperate in certain sectors as it is expressed in bilateral commitments. Concerning the EU Accession Negotiations of these countries, Vucic said that he does not expect the negotiation to come to completion soon, believing that the negotiations are not entirely merit-based and there are several significant political obstacles for them. Although Vucic stated that they want to pursue an independent foreign policy even though he underlined that they value the cooperation of China and Russia.

Additionally, he mentioned that Ukraine supports the territorial integrity of Serbia, by not recognizing the independence of Kosovo; therefore, they have never viewed Ukraine as an enemy. Concerning the Russo-Ukrainian War despite recognizing the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Serbia did not hesitate to refuse joining the Western sanction against Russia, proving that they still value their traditional geopolitical partnership with Russia. Serbia's reluctance to join sanctions complicates the EU Accession Negotiations for Serbia since the EU Commission expects to achieve a consensus regarding the sanctions against Russia believing that it is one of the central points in the accession negotiations. Even though Vucic is criticized for his insistence on pursuing a balancing foreign policy, especially by the nationalist and conservative circles of Serbia some of whom comprise of his domestic supporters, for abandoning a pro-Russian and anti-Western stance, Vucic also refrains from fully aligning Serbia with the European Union's decisions and geopolitical policies. Although the visit is likely to attract criticism from Moscow, it is unlikely that Russia would seek to jeopardize its relationship with Serbia over a single diplomatic engagement with Ukraine. And it should be considered that to what extent in this partnership either side could forsake the partnership of other considering their economic and political needs.



Even though it seems unlikely that Serbia could abandon their traditionally induced and geopolitically reinforced, concerning the Kosovo issue, pro-Russian stance in their foreign policy entirely, by seeking greater opportunities for economic diversification and reducing Serbia's dependence on Russia, particularly in the energy sector, Vučić appears to be attempting to create greater room for manoeuvre in Serbia's foreign policy. Moreover, in while doing so Vucic is trying to demonstrate that, supported by his statements, he is acting on a pragmatic agenda based on the Serbian national interests rather than choosing sides between the EU and Russia. So interpreting Vucic's foreign policy moves as indicators for greater geopolitical implications might be wrong as it seems that Vucic is trying to preserve Serbia's national autonomy in foreign policy and in economic affairs while trying to increase their opportunities for broader objectives. It is safe to assume that Serbia would be acting cautiously in displaying a more determined stance regarding their possible EU membership and in abandoning Russian partnership as long as Serbia's energy dependency to Russia continues; thus, the EU Commission should not expect Serbia to take a bold move until they come up with alternatives regarding reducing the energy-based and economic dependency of Serbia to Russia.



The Global South Is No Longer Waiting for the West

For decades, the global economic order was built around institutions largely shaped by Western powers. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, dollar-based financial system and Western-led trade structures became the main channels through which development was financed and international economic relations were organised. Today, however, the Global South is not necessarily trying to replace this system overnight. A more gradual transformation is taking place: new institutions and payment mechanisms are being built alongside the existing order. This distinction matters. The rise of BRICS is often presented as an attempt to create an alternative to the West, but its more significant impact may lie elsewhere. Rather than constructing a single replacement for the existing system, emerging economies are developing multiple channels through which they



can reduce their dependence on Western-controlled financial infrastructure. The New Development Bank is one example. Iran is now preparing to join the institution, while the bank has already expanded its membership beyond the original BRICS countries. Financial infrastructure is becoming another important part of this shift. BRICS countries are discussing the possibility of connecting national payment systems and central bank digital currencies, while India continues to promote greater use of local currencies in international transactions. These initiatives may appear technical, but their political significance is considerable. Payment systems determine how easily countries can trade, transfer money and access international markets. The ability to create alternative channels therefore provides states with greater room for manoeuvre when geopolitical tensions affect the existing financial system. Yet it would be misleading to describe this as the beginning of a post-dollar world. The US dollar remains deeply embedded in global trade, financial markets and international reserves, and replacing it would require much more than creating alternative institutions. Even within BRICS, countries have different economic interests, political priorities and attitudes toward the dollar. The more realistic possibility is fragmentation rather than replacement. The international system may increasingly consist of overlapping financial networks, regional payment mechanisms and development institutions rather than one

dominant architecture. Recent research also suggests that institutionalised BRICS financial cooperation can strengthen the economic resilience of emerging markets, particularly during global financial shocks. This is where the Global South's growing influence becomes important. Its objective does not necessarily have to be the destruction of the Western-led order. The greater challenge may be its gradual erosion through the creation of alternatives that make dependence less necessary. The real transformation, therefore, may not be the emergence of a new global order replacing the old one, but a world in which the West no longer has the only institutions capable of defining how the global economy works.



The Han Kuang Exercises and Taiwan's Evolving Defense Strategy

Taiwan has recently started to develop a broader approach to national defense by combining military capabilities with civilian preparedness. This approach can be clearly observed in the Han Kuang military exercises. Unlike previous exercises, which often focused on military equipment and weapons,



the recent exercises have placed greater emphasis on operational flexibility, coordination, communication, and the ability of society to continue functioning during a crisis. One important element of this new approach is the use of the “backbriefing” system, which was inspired by the US military model. Under this system, lowerranking officers explain to their commanders how they plan to carry out the orders they receive. This method aims to increase the ability of military personnel to make independent decisions during a conflict. Taiwan also mobilized around 20,000 reserve soldiers during the exercises. This is particularly important because Taiwan faces a significant military imbalance in comparison with China. At the same time, Taiwan is trying to improve its ability to respond to gray-zone activities, which create continuous security pressure without directly leading to a conventional war. Another important dimension of Taiwan’s defense strategy is cyber and communication security. During the exercises, mobile internet speeds were deliberately reduced to 256 Kbps for 30 minutes in seven major cities. This scenario was designed to simulate the possible disruption of mobile networks during a conflict with China. However, fixed internet connections and Wi-Fi were not affected. The exercise therefore aimed to examine alternative communication channels that could remain available during a crisis. It also provided an opportunity to evaluate how communication problems and information disorder could affect the civilian population.

The maritime dimension of the exercises also focused on cooperation between military and civilian institutions. For the first time, Taiwan’s Navy and Coast Guard conducted a joint operation to protect commercial ships. They practiced escorting ships through safe maritime routes after mines had been removed. These exercises are particularly significant because a possible Chinese blockade could limit Taiwan’s access to international trade and essential supplies. Civilian preparedness was another major part of the exercises. During air raid simulations, streets were emptied, access to some metro stations was restricted, and civilians were directed to shelters. Hospitals also practiced moving medical services to protected areas. President Lai Ching-te visited important hospitals together with senior diplomatic representatives from the United States, Canada, and Israel. These activities demonstrate that Taiwan’s defense strategy increasingly includes civilian infrastructure, healthcare, communication networks, and international cooperation, rather than focusing only on conventional military forces. China has strongly criticized Taiwan’s military exercises. Beijing described the exercises as unnecessary and accused Taiwan of increasing tensions in the region. China has also continued to state that it does not renounce the use of military force against Taiwan. During the exercises, Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels remained active around the island. This situation



demonstrates that Taiwan's new defense strategy is developing in an environment of continuous military and political pressure. Overall, Taiwan is moving from a mainly military-centered understanding of deterrence toward a more comprehensive national defense model. This model aims to increase not only the military capacity of the island but also the resilience of its civilian population, communication systems, healthcare infrastructure, and economy. Therefore, the Han Kuang exercises can be understood as an attempt to prepare Taiwan for a possible conflict in which military, cyber, economic, and civilian dimensions would operate simultaneously.



U.S. Demands Compensation from Iran, Ignores Gaza: The Ultimate Double Standard in Human Rights

U.S. President Donald Trump's demand following Tehran's initial claims for compensation for official compensation on behalf of all individuals killed or injured because of Iran's actions has reignited debates on

accountability and human rights in international relations. While it is a standard diplomatic tactic for states to demand reparations from one another amid geopolitical tensions, the U.S.'s expansion of this logic into a discourse of humanitarian responsibility elevates the issue to the realm of universal human rights. Undoubtedly, the legal and financial liability of actors for harm inflicted on civilians is a fundamental principle of international law. Yet, the fact that these same actors and global mechanisms have avoided addressing the mass civilian casualties and humanitarian tragedy that have been ongoing in Gaza for months within a similar framework of justice and compensation reveals a profound double standard. The fundamental basis of international law and the universal human rights regime is the assumption that every individual's right to life is inviolable and equal. In today's global political practice, however, this principle has been reshaped in accordance with political power balances and geopolitical interests, transforming it into an implicit "hierarchy of human life." The United States' demand for compensation on behalf of its citizens who lost their lives or suffered harm due to Iran's actions articulated as a counter-discourse to Tehran's initial claims can be regarded as a legitimate pursuit of rights under the principle of reparations in international law. Conversely, this legal logic abruptly loses its validity when applied to the Gaza region.



It is striking that when it comes to thousands of civilians in Gaza who are “different” in terms of ethnicity, identity, and geography who have lost their lives or suffered severe injuries, the same states and international institutions refrain from raising a similar legal accountability mechanism, language of sanctions, or demand for compensation. This contradiction clearly demonstrates that the modern system does not regard human life as a universal value but rather ranks it according to the identity of the perpetrator, the victim’s passport, and the strategic importance of the region where the incident occurred. Categorizing the right to life in this manner strips justice of its status as an equal right and transforms it into a privilege distributed only when power centers deem it appropriate. This hierarchical approach demonstrates that the discourse on universal human rights has ceased to serve as a normative shield of protection and has instead become a tool of political pressure in the hands of global powers. While human rights violations immediately serve as grounds for legal compensation, international sanctions, and condemnation when the perpetrator is a rival state (such as Iran), they are obscured behind rhetoric of “legitimate self-defense” or “unavoidable collateral damage” when the perpetrator is a strategic ally. This blatant instrumentalization of human rights directly triggers a crisis of credibility for international justice mechanisms and global institutions.

As long as institutions such as the United Nations, the international Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice fail to take deterrent measures in the face of mass civilian casualties in Gaza and remain stymied by vetoes, the very foundation of the concept of a “rules-based international order” is being shaken. In conclusion, in a global equation where justice is invoked only against geopolitical rivals and double standards are applied based on the victim’s identity, it becomes impossible to speak of universal human rights. The gulf between the silence surrounding Gaza and the compensation demanded from Iran in the political arena stands as the most concrete evidence of the moral and legal collapse of the modern international system. Unless a comprehensive and impartial understanding of justice is established, human rights are doomed to remain not a universal value, but merely a privilege doled out by the powerful.