Even before the second Taliban takeover of Kabul, the Persian/Iranian community’s feelings and opinions on Afghanistan were in what we would call a contradictory dilemma. Afghanistan is seen as Iran’s historical territory and the center of what they call “Cultural Iran”, but it is not a country that they emotionally embrace. The image of Afghans was bad. In fact, opponents of Persian/Iranian nationalism used Afghanistan and the bad image of Afghans to denigrate Persian identity. Interestingly, apart from a limited group of Islamists, there was no one who even embraced the “Afghanistan Cause”. As a matter of fact, Iranian society neither accepted the Afghan migration nor embraced Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan after 1979.
The position of Afghanistan in Iranian public opinion has changed with the Taliban’s second takeover of Kabul. Today, Afghanistan is at the center of domestic politics, identity, nationalism and political debate more than ever before in Iranian history. In this process, the Afghanistan issue has turned into a nationalist struggle with very serious sides. This has led to a confrontation between the Iranian state, which is reshaping its Afghanistan policy through the Taliban, and the Persian/Iranian nationalist community, which categorically rejects the Taliban. While Iran has temporarily succeeded in redirecting the nationalist backlash against it towards Azerbaijan and Turkey through strained relations with Azerbaijan, it has little chance of covering up the Afghanistan issue in the long run. All these developments have brought about the necessity to re-analyze Iran-Taliban relations. In our article, why do Iranian/Persian nationalists react? What does Tehran expect from the Taliban? In whose favor is the balance in Iran-Taliban relations? Could Afghanistan be a part of the sectarian conflict in the Middle East? How will the Pakistan-Iran rivalry take shape? What would be the consequences of Taliban’s statehood for Iran? will try to examine Iran-Taliban relations within the framework of various questions such as.
Encounter of Nationalisms
First of all, it should be noted that from the point of view of Iranian nationalism, the Taliban’s dominance in Afghanistan will seriously undermine the Persian/Iranian identity if it fails to take Afghanistan out of the Iranian cultural basin. It is likely that the Taliban will turn into a cultural, religious and ideological/political multi-faceted obstacle to Iranian/Persian nationalism. The correct way to understand this process is to examine the relationship between Pashtu nationalism and Taliban ideology.
One of the most important others of Pashtu nationalism is the Persian/Dari language and its influence in Afghanistan. According to Pashtu nationalists, although Pashtuns ostensibly rule Afghanistan, the real power lies with the Persian/Dari language. The Persian/Dari language has established its cultural power and transformed the Afghan state and society in its favor. According to them, the liberation of Afghanistan will be possible by getting rid of the Persian/Dari language, which has established its cultural hegemony. From this perspective, Pashtu nationalism has implicitly risen based on anti-Iranianism. The rise of Pashtu nationalism will limit Iran’s sphere of influence.
Although the Taliban rhetorically reject tribalism and nationalism, in practice they are identical with tribalism. The Taliban also oppose secular Pashtu nationalism and have killed some of its representatives for these reasons. Taliban nationalism has in fact been the most prominent nationalism in the contemporary history of Afghanistan.
Although he was against the deeply rooted secular Pashtu nationalism, we can say that he put forward a kind of conservative nationalism by combining Islam, Afghan and Pashtu language.
According to the Taliban, although Afghanistan has two official languages, Pashto and Dari/Persian, Farsi/Dari is spoken at almost every level of the state. The Persian/Dari language has practically transformed itself into a national language by overpowering Pashto. The effectiveness of the Persian/Dari language was also manifested in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the military and security bureaucracies have become institutions where Persian speakers (Tajiks) are dominant. The Taliban says that this influence is not fair according to the population ratio and must change. Therefore, they want Pashto to become a national language.
There is also a sectarian reason for the Taliban’s opposition to the Persian language. The Taliban remains intellectually anti-Shiite, although today it says it has changed. Persian is the language not only of the Tajiks but also of the Khazars, who are Shiites. On the other hand, as the official language of Iran, it also has an apparent sectarian dimension. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s statement that “Persian is the first language of Shiism and the second language of Islam” reinforces the perception of the identity between Shiism and Persian.
The Taliban also sees the Persian language as one of Iran’s instruments of influence in Afghanistan. The Taliban supporters circulated a message on social networks that read: “Iran has two things in common with the Hazaras in Afghanistan: language and religion. It has two things in common with the Tajiks: ethnicity and language. It is also different from the Pashtuns in language, religion and ethnicity”. They place the Hazara and Tajiks as an “extension of Iran” and themselves as the exception. Limiting the Persian language means limiting Iranian culture. One of the reasons for the Iranian/Persian nationalists’ support for the Punjshir and their opposition to the Taliban is the near-term deployment of Pashtu nationalism against the Persian/Dari language
The Construction of Sovereignty
Although the Taliban was an organization fighting against the United States when Iran-Taliban relations began, today it is in the process of ambitious, assertive and aggressive statehood, seeking to seize power in Kabul and transform society within the framework of religious and ideological/political views. Moreover, unlike when it was an organization, the Taliban states that it wants to establish good relations with the US. Iran did not expect this radical transformation in Afghanistan and was not prepared for it. The Taliban’s statehood has confronted Iran with a new and complex process with limited room for maneuver and options.
Due to the lack of a well-established centralized state structure, Afghanistan has had little opportunity to protect its sovereignty against other countries. The wide, diverse, deep and multidimensional influence and activity gained by foreign states in Afghanistan are indicative of this phenomenon. Due to this problem, other states have had the opportunity to develop relations with social groups in Afghanistan independently of the state, without its permission and even against it. As a matter of fact, a significant part of Afghan groups are known to follow the interests of the countries they receive support from. This is a clear indication of the lack of national consciousness and nation-state in Afghanistan.
The Taliban seems to aim to strengthen the central state due to its over-centralized thinking. It was foreseeable that the Taliban, like all ideological groups, would want to have absolute control over the country when they took over the state. Because if it wants to transform the state and society, it is essential for the state to have the power to control every area. Iran and other
It makes it problematic how states will survive in the future. Iran was previously able to develop relations with Tajiks and Shiites as it wished, even without permission from the central government. However, the Taliban’s desire to strengthen the state and build sovereignty seems to limit Iran’s room for maneuver. In other words, it is highly likely that Iran’s influence in Afghanistan will diminish with the Taliban’s statehood and sovereignty building.
Due to the Taliban’s despotic nature, it is unlikely to allow social, religious, sectarian and linguistic groups in Afghanistan to establish relations with other countries independently and without his permission. As the Taliban grows stronger, it is likely to limit the activities of foreigners in the country. The Taliban would clearly not want to continue the loose process of denying sovereignty that was established after 1979 and consolidated after the 1990s. Iran’s inability to deal with Panjshir is the first sign of this. The Taliban can say to Iran, as it did to Tajikistan, “don’t interfere in my internal affairs”.
If Iran had pursued a policy in Afghanistan based on national interests, it would have worked to increase the effectiveness of the former government (the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) instead of supporting the Taliban. However, instead of pursuing a policy in Afghanistan based on national interests, Iran has pursued a policy based on tensions with the United States. Although the US withdrawal from Afghanistan provided Iran with limited ideological gains, it also posed various geopolitical risks and threats, such as Taliban statehood. The contradictions of pragmatism, national-interest and ideology are always present in Iran’s foreign policy, and these contradictions lead Iran into unforeseen traps and crises. If ideological victory does not translate into geopolitical gain, it becomes a machine that can destroy the ideology itself.
The Birth of Instability
The Taliban’s opposition to Iran is ideological and religious and is an integral part of its ideological identity. ”The Taliban cannot be Iranianist”, but for pragmatist reasons it may wish to maintain good relations with Iran. It is possible to say that the Taliban can shape many of its institutional capabilities, including security, intelligence, education and propaganda, explicitly and implicitly based on The Taliban’s inclusiveness is another factor challenging Iran. Iran is not the only one facing this problem. The countries of the world also do not have a clear perspective on how to relate to the Taliban. Because the Taliban’s ideas do not coincide with the world’s understanding of inclusiveness. Looking at the current process, it does not seem easy for the world to reach a common point on inclusiveness with the Taliban. The Taliban’s radical ideological/political identity, religious interpretation, sexist understanding and exclusionary nationalist-conservative view have the potential to divide social strata instead of uniting them. The Taliban’s understanding of inclusiveness is incompatible with Afghanistan’s multi-faceted social, cultural, political, sectarian, ethno-linguistic and historical achievements and accumulations. The issue of inclusiveness is an important problem between Iran and the Taliban. Iran sees the protection of its interests in Afghanistan in the establishment of a state that includes all ethnic, linguistic, religious, sectarian and political/ideological groups. However, the Taliban’s concept of inclusiveness does not coincide with Iran’s goals. The Taliban’s inclusiveness seems to be based on a framework that excludes Iran’s interests in Afghanistan.
The Taliban’s Iran policy is clear. The Taliban wants good relations with Iran but opposes Iran’s interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. From this perspective, the Taliban will destroy Iran’s instruments of influence in Afghanistan if they get the opportunity, chance and power. anti-Iranianism. It is possible to predict that the Taliban will not want Iran’s activities such as intelligence activities and ideology exports and will attempt to prevent them.
The best example of this happened in Panjshir. The Taliban’s biggest blow to Iran was to neutralize Panjshir. Since Panjshir started the resistance against the wishes of the Iranian state, he did not receive the support he had hoped for from Tehran. This situation seriously undermined Iran’s reputation at home. It also raised questions about the future of its relations with the Tajiks. The Taliban’s killing of Tajik commanders during the capture of Panjshir may be considered the biggest blow to Iran. Most of the Punjshir commanders and militants killed by the Taliban were Iranian-trained. In fact, by killing the Punjshir commanders, the Taliban cut off an important Iranian arm in Afghanistan. What is interesting is Iran’s silence against this until today. Iran has remained silent not only on Panjshir but also on the Taliban’s forcing the Hazaras to migrate from the Daykundi region.
Iran can put pressure on the Taliban, but there are risks involved in doing so. Iran’s strained relations with the Taliban could expose it to various problems. The defeat of the Taliban would obviously have many costs for Iran.
The defeat of the Taliban means protracted internal conflict and instability in Afghanistan, which in turn means mass migration and drug trafficking to Iran. The defeat of the Taliban would also mean the strengthening of anti-Shiite organizations such as ISIS-K, a dangerous mess that could drag Iran into an uncertain adventure in Afghanistan. Moreover, the internal conflict and rising radicalism in Afghanistan could invite a new invitation for the US to return to Afghanistan. This makes Iran more dependent on the Taliban. It seems that the balance in Iran-Taliban relations is tilted in favor of the Taliban. Iran’s recent economic, commercial and political relations with the Taliban should be evaluated from this perspective.
There are other reasons why Iran is more cautious towards the Taliban. We can also talk about what we can call Afghanistan fatigue in Iranian politics. Because the conflicts and the political process in Afghanistan are not developing in line with Iran’s national interests. Especially after 1979, Iran faces the challenges of preventing threats and averting crises instead of seeking opportunities in Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan’s geopolitical vitality is extremely important for Iran, it has not been able to capitalize on this opportunity. This has plunged Iran into protracted diplomatic, political, economic, military and other tensions.
Another reason for Iran’s more cautious attitude towards the Taliban is Tehran’s desire for a strong central state in Afghanistan. The weakness of the central state in Afghanistan has done more harm to Iran than good. It has created various threats such as migration, human and drug trafficking, radicalism, terrorism, global and regional tensions. The Taliban’s ability to build a strong state could be in Iran’s favor in this respect. If a strong central state emerges in Afghanistan, migration may decrease, the water problem between the two countries can be solved, drug and human trafficking can be controlled, and the opportunity to benefit from Afghanistan’s geopolitical opportunity may arise.
Risks of Sectarian Conflicts
From the Iranian perspective, Afghanistan is part of Shiite geopolitics. For many years, Iran has been using Afghans as an armed force in all its conflicts in the Middle East. The Fatimiyoun Army, composed of Afghan Shiites, is the clearest example of this. In fact, Afghan Shiites have been turned into a part of the sectarian conflict in the Middle East due to Iran’s policies.
Although Iran has made Afghan Shiites a part of the sectarian conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan is not a country in the Middle East for Iran. If Iran tries to continue the sectarian conflict in Afghanistan, which it has initiated and led in the Middle East, it could face serious problems and lead it to major domestic and foreign policy disasters. First of all, it would bring the Taliban closer to some countries in the Middle East. Afghanistan’s Shiites could face the same massacres they have always suffered in the past. Moreover, unlike in the Middle East, conflicts in this region could easily spill over into Iran. Shia-Sunni conflict in Afghanistan would strain Iran’s relations with China, Russia and Pakistan. Sectarian conflict inevitably leads to radical groups massing in Afghanistan. This would clearly not be acceptable for regional countries such as Russia and China. Iran does not want to confront Russia and China. Iran is known to look after the interests of Russia and China in its foreign policy and security strategies, as seen in its Central Asia and Caucasus policies.
The sectarian conflict in Afghanistan could spill over into Pakistan, which has a large Shia population. If Iran pursues a sectarian policy in Afghanistan, its relations with Pakistan will be upset. Iran is constrained by Pakistan’s good relations with the Gulf countries. Iran does not want to bring Pakistan closer to the Gulf countries. Adding Pakistan to the equation in the Middle East is something Iran does not want. In addition, the Gulf countries can reach Iran’s Sunni regions more easily through Pakistan and the Taliban. Pakistan’s influence in Iranian Beljistan is undeniable. Moreover, by conducting joint exercises with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Pakistan has shown that it has the possibility of opening a new front against Tehran that it did not calculate. The more Iran succeeds, the more it may want to avoid the emergence of this process. This makes the Taliban’s hand stronger against Iran.
While Pakistan wants to contain Iran over the Taliban, it does not want to turn this rivalry into an open escalation. Iran-Pakistan tensions could complicate Pakistan’s fragile domestic process. While Pakistan would like to work with the Gulf states, it has already shown that it does not want to carry their anti-Iranian burden. Pakistan does not want Shia-Sunni and Tehran-Saudi tensions in Afghanistan. Pakistan and Iran do not want to turn their rivalry over Afghanistan into tension and conflict. Although neither country is in favor of this conflict as of today, both countries are preparing for “bad days”. Because Afghanistan’s fragile internal balances may take the process to unpredictable places. It is possible to say that one of the goals of ISIS-K’s bombing attack on a Shiite Mosque in Kunduz province was to create a Shiite-Sunni conflict and thus put Iran, the Taliban and Pakistan into a process they do not desire. Moreover, the Taliban’s inability to solve the problem of its relations with the world by continuing its current practices, the financial and economic crisis in the country, mass poverty, famine and mass starvation, the possibility of civil war as seen in Punjshir, the spread of ISIS-K attacks and similar problems make it difficult to predict where the political process in Afghanistan will lead.